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ABSTRACT 
This Article highlights a particular strength of the World Heritage 
Convention within the international environmental law project that 
enhances conservation of natural areas, flora, and fauna. This strength 
relates to the World Heritage Convention’s ability to pull states towards 
meaningful compliance with obligations connected to protecting, 
conserving, presenting, and transferring to future generations the world’s 
natural (and cultural) heritage. 
After a general introduction to the World Heritage Convention, 
Parts III and IV explain how compliance pull is created through 
institutional arrangements. Those institutional arrangements focus upon 
devolving ultimate power over implementation from the contracting 
parties acting collectively to a smaller executive authority—the World 
Heritage Committee. Significantly, this committee ultimately has the 
capacity to withhold substantial benefits to contracting parties in the 
event of non-cooperation or breach of obligations, and to take other 
measures that impact the contracting parties’ self-interest. Thus, even 
though the dominant and preferred strategy adopted by the committee is 
rightly one of non-confrontation, cooperation, and support, this 
sanctioning option remains significant. Ultimately, while it is not denied 
that compliance can be influenced by extra-convention factors, it is 
asserted that the system created under the treaty introduces significant 
factors into a state’s logic of consequences, exerting a pull towards 
action in compliance with obligations. 
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This results in an atypical, multi-lateral environmental agreement 
under which decisions as to the normative content, access to benefits, 
meaning and existence of compliance, and threat or imposition of 
sanctions are beyond the control of an individual state. The atypical 
nature of the situation is demonstrated in Part V by a comparative 
analysis with other multi-lateral environmental agreements. The main 
focus of that comparative analysis is upon those treaties whose non-
compliance procedures have received the majority share of academic 
attention. As will be demonstrated, there is little justification for the 
current practice of omitting reference to the World Heritage Convention 
in that compliance discourse. 
With extensive power over the normative content of the 
Convention, and the means to enforce its own interpretation of that 
normative content, the legitimacy of the World Heritage Committee and 
its activities is vital. This Article therefore finishes in Part VI by drawing 
attention to problems of indeterminacy and the composition of the 
Committee. These are areas requiring action in order to shore-up the 
legitimacy of the executive body, and thereby ensure continued 
compliance pull. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 17, 1975, the World Heritage Convention (“WHC”) 
entered into force.1 The text, which had been adopted just over three 
years previously at the General Assembly of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”), was the 
result of two international initiatives supported by UNESCO and the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”).2 
In 1960, the construction of the Aswan High Dam threatened a 
number of important Egyptian monuments including the temple of 
Ramses II at Abu Simbel.3 International campaigns organized by 
UNESCO and others raised enough money to support the now famous 
relocation and conservation plans which the Egyptian government 
completed for the Abu Simbel monuments.4 In light of this and other 
campaigns to save cultural properties, UNESCO recognized that the 
 
1. See UNESCO World Heritage Centre, State Parties: Ratification Status, 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/, note 1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). See also 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
November 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1358 [hereinafter WHC]. 
2. Francesco Francioni, The Preamble, in THE 1972 WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION 
A COMMENTARY 11, 13-15 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2008). 
3. Id. at 12-13; SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 208 (1985). 
4. LYSTER, supra note 3, at 208. 
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future mobilization of international aid for cultural and historic 
preservation would benefit from a formalized, rather than ad hoc, 
procedure.5 
Concurrently, the IUCN was developing the idea that there existed 
throughout the world natural and cultural areas of such value that they 
should be held in trust for all humankind.6 These sites were identified as 
a part of the heritage of every human, not just the nationals of the 
endowed states.7 While work had begun within UNESCO to formulate a 
convention on cultural heritage, parallel advocacy by IUCN for a natural 
heritage agreement began to have an impact.8 Ultimately, this resulted in 
a compromise text with a dual focus on cultural and natural heritage: 
what would become the WHC.9 It also led to a close working 
relationship between UNESCO and IUCN that continues today.10 
The inclusion of natural heritage has significantly enhanced the 
portfolio of international environmental laws. In conjunction with the 
1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat (“Ramsar,” after the Iranian town where the treaty 
was signed),11 the 1973 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (“CITES”),12 the 1979 Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,13 and the 1992 
 
5. Id. at 209. 
6. The development of this idea is attributed to Russell Train, although Train also 
gives credit to Dr. Joseph Fisher with whom Train was working in the mid-1960’s. 
Speech of Russell Train, Chairman of the World Wildlife Fund, Remarks Before the 
International World Heritage Committee Meeting (Dec. 7, 1992), available at 
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repcom92.htm#inf1 [hereinafter Speech of R. Train]; See 
also D. J. Haigh, World Heritage – Principle and Practice: A Case for Change 17(3) 
ENVTL & PLAN. L. J. 199, 199 (2000). 
7. H. K. Eidsvik, The World Heritage Convention, Yesterday – Today – and 
Tomorrow: An Overview in CRITICAL ISSUES FOR PROTECTED AREAS PART 1: WORLD 
HERITAGE SESSION 15 (Workshop Papers from the 18th General Assembly of IUCN, 
1991). 
8. Speech of R. Train, supra note 6. 
9. Francioni, supra note 2, at 14-15; WHC, supra note 1, at Preamble. 
10. See, e.g., Sarah M. Titchen, Challenging the Spirit: A Brief History, 2 WORLD 
CONSERVATION 6, 6 (2001). 
11. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 11 I.L.M 963 [hereinafter Ramsar]. See also The Official Website 
of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, http://www.ramsar.org/ (last visited Mar. 2, 
2009). 
12. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, March 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. See also The Official 
Website of CITES, http://www.cites.org/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
13. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 
23, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 15. See also The Official Website of the Convention on Migratory 
Species, http://www.cms.int/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
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Convention on Biological Diversity,14 the WHC is widely regarded as 
one of the centerpiece multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) 
concerned with wildlife and habitat conservation.15 
This Article will focus on the way in which the WHC generates 
“compliance pull,”16 especially via the institutional mechanisms by 
which the WHC draws states towards meeting their obligations. The 
commitments that will be the primary focus of this Article are those that 
concern protecting, conserving, presenting, and transferring to future 
generations the cultural and natural heritage within each state’s 
territory.17 The way compliance pull is exerted distinguishes the WHC 
from all other MEAs. Indeed, there is little justification for the current 
practice of omitting reference to the Convention in compliance discourse. 
The WHC deserves to be considered alongside those non-compliance 
procedures that have received the majority share of academic attention,18 
such as CITES; the 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (“Aarhus Convention”);19 and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”).20 This 
Article will illustrate the similarities between the WHC and other MEAs, 
while maintaining that the WHC remains distinct in the following key 
respect. 
The enhanced compliance pull of the WHC is achieved by 
devolving ultimate power over implementation from the contracting 
parties to a smaller executive authority. Significantly, as will be 
explained, this body has the capacity to withhold substantial benefits 
from contracting parties in the event of non-cooperation or breach of 
obligations. Consequently, the WHC undermines the claim that strict 
 
14. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818. See also The 
Official Website of the Convention on Biological Diversity, http://www.cbd.int/ (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
15. PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 672 (3d ed. 2009); LYSTER, supra note 3, at 179-181. 
16. To adopt Thomas Franck’s apt terminology describing the extent to which a rule 
or set of rules exert a pulling force towards compliance upon those states to which it is 
addressed. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 25 
(1990). 
17. WHC, supra note 1, at Art. 4. 
18. See, e.g., references infra note 138. 
19. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 
[hereinafter the Aarhus Convention]. See also The Official Website of the Aarhus 
Convention, http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
20. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 
26 I.L.M. 1550 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. See also The Official Website of the 
Montreal Protocol, http://ozone.unep.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
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enforcement and deterrence are not possible in an international legal 
system lacking a hierarchically superior enforcement body.21 
Employing such an authoritative body to enforce compliance is not 
without drawbacks. Natasha Affolder notes occasions where the WHC’s 
system has led to “[the] inaccurate but potent image of the U.N.’s ‘black 
helicopters’ flying over and policing” the land of states thought to be 
acting contrary to obligations.22 Therefore, this Article will also explore 
some of the current problems with the WHC system that may undermine 
the legitimacy of its executive body and thus its compliance pull. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PERTINENT ELEMENTS OF 
THE WHC 
While the phrase “World Heritage Site” might be familiar to 
students, scholars, and the general public, it seems less likely that this 
familiarity will extend to the mechanisms which confer this status, or to 
the obligations relating to such designated areas. Consequently, and as a 
preliminary to themes to be developed, an account of some key elements 
of the WHC is required. 
A. The WHC’s Jurisdiction 
The WHC regulates both cultural and natural heritage.23 Given the 
environmental focus of this discussion, Article 2 is pertinent since it 
defines natural heritage as: 
(a) Natural features consisting of physical and biological 
formations of outstanding universal value scientifically or 
aesthetically; 
(b) The habitat (which may be geophysical or physiographical) 
of threatened species of plants and animals which are of 
outstanding universal value in terms of science and 
conservation; and 
 
21. A view noted in D. G. Victor et al, Systems for Implementation Review in THE 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 47, 51 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998). For further support on the 
executive role of the World Heritage Committee see Diana Zacharias, The UNESCO 
Regime for the Protection of World Heritage as Prototype of an Autonomy-Gaining 
International Institution, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1833, 1840-47 (2008). 
22. Natasha Affolder, Mining and the World Heritage Convention: Democratic 
Legitimacy and Treaty Compliance, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 35, 42 (2007). 
23. WHC, supra note 1, at Arts. 1, 2. 
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(c) Natural sites or areas of outstanding universal value from 
the point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty.24 
The authority for identifying and delineating those sites which meet 
this definition is left to the contracting parties and is limited to areas 
situated within each state’s territory.25 
Helpfully, the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the 
World Heritage Convention (“Guidelines”) provide extra guidance for 
interpreting definitions and key terms.26 For example, the Guidelines 
define the phrase “outstanding universal value” as “natural significance 
which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of 
common importance for present and future generations of all 
humanity.”27 
This authoritative interpretation of Article 2 is broad enough to 
include a wide range of landscape and habitat types, but it also sets a 
high standard that generates one of the most significant, albeit 
intentional, limitations of the WHC. Limiting the sites to be protected to 
the “best of the best” by the outstanding universal value test excludes 
most areas.28 The Guidelines confirm that “[t]he Convention is not 
intended to ensure the protection of all properties of great interest, 
importance or value, but only for a select list of the most outstanding of 
these from an international viewpoint.”29 
The narrow scope of the WHC distinguishes it from other MEAs, 
such as Ramsar or the Convention on Biological Diversity. However, as 
will be explained, the WHC’s exclusivity goes a long way towards 
 
24. Id. at Art. 2. 
25. Id. at Art. 3. 
26. UN Educ. Scientific & Cultural Org. (UNESCO), OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES 
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION, WHC 05/2 (Feb. 2, 
2005) available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide05-en.pdf [hereinafter 
Guidelines]. The Guidelines are mainly intended to inform contracting parties about the 
principles which guide the way the World Heritage Committee and world heritage lists 
work (both of which are described in detail later). They were created, and have been 
continually updated, as part of the World Heritage Committee’s program of work. They 
are not legally binding, although their practical importance for implementation, as 
explained in this Article, should not be underestimated. See also Catherine Redgwell, 
Article 2 Definition of Natural Heritage in THE 1972 WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY 63, 66-67 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2008). 
27. Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶ 49. 
28. See e.g. the decision of the World Heritage Committee in relation to the 
nominated site of Kopacki rit, Croatia which was felt to be of only European scale 
importance; Report of the 24th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, 38 
WHC-2000/CONF.204/21 (Feb. 2001). 
29. Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶ 52. 
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establishing a global brand that can generate benefits for states and parts 
of the environment. 
B. The Obligations Imposed 
Identifying a particular area as falling within the definition of 
“natural heritage” has two consequences. First, the state endowed with 
the site, and the other contracting parties to the WHC, assume certain 
obligations with respect to that area.30 Second, the area can be nominated 
for recognition as a World Heritage Site. These effects will be discussed 
in turn. 
Under Article 4, a state must protect, conserve, present, and transfer 
to future generations all sites of natural heritage within its territory.31 
This obligation is to be performed to the utmost of the state’s own 
resources and with any assistance forthcoming from others.32 This 
obligation is further elaborated in Article 5, which calls on states to 
maintain a responsible agency (with appropriate staff and means) to 
fulfill the duty articulated in Article 4.33 Further, states shall endeavor to 
take the appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative, and 
financial measures to identify, protect, conserve, present, and re-
habilitate natural heritage areas.34 
Although this review principally focuses on the inherent propensity 
of the WHC to generate compliance with these obligations, the 
commitment under Article 6 of the instrument is also relevant to issues 
developed later. Article 6 relates to the obligations owed by all 
contracting parties to the World Heritage Sites situated outside their 
territories. Thus, Article 6(3) obliges state parties to refrain from 
measures that might directly or indirectly damage the natural heritage 
 
30. A focus and distinction is deliberately being maintained in this Article between 
these site-specific obligations, and more general operational or administrative 
obligations, such as the obligations to file systematic reports or to make the annual 
contributions to the fund maintained under the WHC. 
31. WHC, supra note 1, Art. 4: 
Each State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of ensuring the 
identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future 
generations of the cultural and natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 
and situated on its territory, belongs primarily to the State. It will do all it can to 
this end, to the utmost of its own resources and, where appropriate, with any 
international assistance and co-operation, in particular, financial, artistic, 
scientific and technical, which it may be able to obtain. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at Art. 5(b). 
34. Id. at Art. 5(d). 
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situated in the territory of another participating state.35 In addition, 
Article 6(2) obliges state parties to assist other state parties with sites 
inscribed in the World Heritage List and the List of World Heritage in 
Danger.36 
C. The World Heritage Inventories 
For the WHC to act as a formalized system for the mobilization of 
international responsibility and support for the earth’s outstanding 
heritage, an identification system had to be put in place to determine 
which sites should benefit from such initiatives. The system employed 
centers around an official list of sites that have been independently 
verified as being of outstanding natural value—the World Heritage List. 
This list is maintained by the Intergovernmental Committee for the 
Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage of Outstanding Universal 
Value, commonly known as the World Heritage Committee (“the 
Committee”).37 There are twenty-one seats on the Committee that are 
filled by states elected by, and from within, the contracting parties.38 
The listing mechanism can be viewed in three stages. First, state 
parties must identify sites they feel fall within the Article 1 and 2 
definitions.39 From these, “Tentative Lists” of sites that a state would 
like to see included in the World Heritage List are to be produced, “so far 
as possible,” and submitted to the Committee.40 The state can then elect 
to begin a nomination process for inscription on the World Heritage List 
by collecting and submitting all the requisite documentation for any site 
it wishes to be considered by the Committee in a given year.41 Thus, the 
contracting parties control the early stages of the listing process. Sites 
must be situated in the nominating state’s boundaries and it is not in the 
power of the Committee, nor another state, to require a contracting party 
to nominate a particular area. As Simon Lyster points out, “however 
 
35. Id. at Art. 6(3) (“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to take any 
deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural 
heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 situated on the territory of other States Parties to 
this Convention”). 
36. The last of these lists is described in more detail in Part II.C.2. 
37. The Committee was established under WHC, supra note 1, Art. 8. 
38. WHC, supra note 1, Art. 8(1). 
39. Id. at Art. 3. This process should involve the production of inventories. 
40. Id. at Art. 11(1); Guidelines supra note 26, ¶¶ 62, 65. The original terminology 
of inventories as used in the WHC has given way to that of tentative lists. This helps to 
distinguish this document from the desired preceding step of producing national 
inventories, which are for information purposes and use at the national level. Further, as 
to the problems of qualifiers to the effectiveness of duties, see infra Part V(B). 
41. The details of the nomination process are provided in Part III of the Guidelines. 
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much the Committee might think a site worthy of inclusion in the List, it 
only becomes eligible for selection after the Party in whose territory it is 
situated has made an appropriate proposal.”42 
However, such state focused control stops there. After the 
nomination process, the treaty introduces a mechanism that emphasizes 
the executive authority of the Committee over the World Heritage List. 
This is important since the principal benefits to be derived under the 
treaty flow from inscription on this list, not from nomination. The 
Committee therefore has control over: (1) initial admittance to the 
inventory; (2) officially declaring that an area of world heritage is in 
danger; and (3) the deletion of a site from the World Heritage List. These 
steps will be considered in turn. 
1. Inscription 
The WHC stipulates that it is for the Committee to “establish, keep 
up to date and publish” the World Heritage List.43 It is the Committee 
that must agree to inscribe a site, pursuant to an objective scientific 
procedure.44 Nominated sites are first assessed by the international 
organizations that have been retained to assist in the operation of the 
WHC.45 This function is performed by IUCN for natural heritage 
nominees.46 Following this assessment, a report is prepared by IUCN for 
the Committee. The Committee then decides, by a two-thirds majority of 
the members present and voting, whether the property should be 
inscribed on the list.47 Only then can a state call a site within its territory 
a World Heritage Site.48 This approach is in contrast to other regimes 
that also seek to recognize important habitat areas. Ramsar, for example, 
allows states to unilaterally inscribe sites on its List of Wetlands of 
International Importance and therefore has no independent approval 
body.49 
 
42. LYSTER, supra note 3, at 211. 
43. WHC, supra note 1, at Art. 11(2). 
44. Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶ 23. 
45. Id. ¶¶ 143-151. 
46. Id. ¶ 145. 
47. WHC, supra note 1, at Art. 13(8). 
48. At the time of writing, there were 878 world heritage sites located in the 
territory of 145 contracting parties, representing both natural and cultural heritage. 
UNESCO, World Heritage List, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (last visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
Some sites contain a mixture of cultural and natural heritage. Id. 
49. Ramsar, supra note 11, at Art. 2(1). 
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2. Sites in Danger 
Article 11(4) states that the Committee: 
shall establish, keep up to date and publish, whenever circumstances 
shall so require, under the title of “List of World Heritage in Danger,” 
a list of the property appearing in the World Heritage List for the 
conservation of which major operations are necessary and for which 
assistance has been requested. . . . The list may only include such 
property . . . as is threatened by serious and specific dangers. . . . 
The dangers faced by natural properties may be either “ascertained,” 
that is, “specific and proven imminent danger,” or “potential,” meaning 
there are “major threats which could have deleterious effects on its 
inherent characteristics.”50 Further, the danger must be one that can be 
corrected by human action.51 
Inclusion of a property on the List of World Heritage in Danger 
(“Danger List”) is a formal recognition of a state of affairs that calls for 
safeguarding measures, and also is a way to secure resources.52 Listed 
sites therefore enjoy a degree of priority when it comes to allocating 
funds under the WHC.53 
3. Deleting Sites 
In the same way that the Committee independently controls which 
sites are inscribed on the list, it alone determines when a property should 
be removed.54 This is permitted in two situations, namely: 
 
50. Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶ 180. 
51. ,Id. ¶ 181. 
52. 1992 Strategic Orientations adopted at the 16th Ordinary Session of the World 
Heritage Committee, ¶ 23 (the adoption and text of the Strategic Orientations are 
recorded in the Report of the 16th Ordinary Sessions of the World Heritage Committee, 
part VII and Annex II respectively). 
53. Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶ 236. The funding stream set up by the WHC is 
discussed in more detail in Part III.A of this Article. 
54. Id. ¶¶ 192-98. Tullio Scovazzi observes that even “if the Convention does not 
explicitly deal with the question, it seems implied in its competences that the WHC, 
which can inscribe properties on the World Heritage List, can also delete them from the 
same List.” Articles 8-11 World Heritage Committee and World Heritage List, in THE 
1972 WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 147, 169 (Francesco Francioni 
ed., 2008). Gionata P. Buzzini and Luigi Condorelli derive the implication that sites may 
be deleted from the World Heritage List from Article 11(2), which calls for the list to be 
updated every two years. Article 11 List of World Heritage in Danger and Deletion of a 
Property from the World Heritage List, in THE 1972 WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY 175, 197 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2008). 
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a) where the property has deteriorated to the extent that it has 
lost the characteristics which merited its inclusion in the first 
place; or 
b) where the intrinsic characteristics were already threatened 
by man at the time of listing and where corrective measures 
outlined by the proposing state at the time of listing have not 
been taken within the proposed time.55 
Information on this state of affairs should come from the relevant 
contracting party. Where the relevant contracting party is not the 
originating source, that source and the information presented must be 
verified in consultation with the state concerned.56 IUCN is also 
requested to comment on the information. Ultimately, the Committee can 
then order that the site be removed from the list. Crucially, the 
Guidelines do not require consent from the relevant contracting party 
prior to deletion, only prior consultation.57 While deletion is a very rare 
event,58 the procedure confirms the executive authority of the 
Committee, rather than the individual contracting parties, over the 
content of the World Heritage List. 
III. THE BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION AND                  
COOPERATION 
The WHC offers contracting parties a range of benefits in return for 
responsible management of World Heritage Sites in accordance with the 
obligations described. Some benefits are financial and developmental, 
while others are political. Although many benefits are similarly available 
under other MEAs, there are some distinguishing features of those 
available under the world heritage regime worth noting. 
A. Economic Gain and Capacity Building 
The inscription of a site onto the World Heritage List is generally 
perceived to bring with it a number of financial advantages. As Jim 
Thorsell noted in his experience as Senior Advisor on Natural Heritage 
 
55. Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶ 192. 
56. Id. ¶¶ 193, 194. 
57. Id. ¶ 196. 
58. To date, just one site has been deleted, namely the Arabian Oryx Sanctuary in 
Oman in 2007. World Heritage Committee Decision 31 COM 7B.11, State of 
Conservation of World Heritage Properties - Arabian Oryx Sanctuary, available at 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/1392/. 
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to IUCN, “inherently, World Heritage is a saleable popular 
commodity. . . . brisk sales of the National Geographic book, Our 
World’s Heritage, and forecasts for a new Harper-McCrae venture, 
Masterworks of Man and Nature, reflect popular interest in World 
Heritage sites.”59 
The most obvious economic benefit to be derived from such popular 
interest is income from visitors.60 By creating a world heritage “brand” 
for sites—highlighting them as “the best of the best” cultural and natural 
landscapes—states are given special opportunities for promoting 
tourism.61 This benefits both local and national economies and goes 
beyond what is available under other MEAs.62 
In addition, the WHC offers other avenues for building capacity. 
There are opportunities for cross-border cooperation between heritage 
managers and stakeholders, and means of obtaining financing for 
heritage projects from other contracting parties. Thus while the option to 
pursue bi-lateral funding streams through links fostered under the WHC 
is, naturally, ever present, the agreement also provides for multi-lateral 
funding distributed from the World Heritage Fund.63 
Lyster has highlighted the existence of the World Heritage Fund as 
one of the WHC’s key features.64 This fund is constituted from money 
collected through compulsory and voluntary contributions from the state 
 
59. Jim Thorsell, The World Heritage Convention After 20 Years: Achievements and 
Challenges, in TOWARDS GREATER UNDERSTANDING AND USE OF THE WORLD HERITAGE 
CONVENTION 25 (Heritage Resources Centre University of Waterloo Occasional Papers 
Series #22, 1992). The second book referenced in the quote, Masterworks of Men and 
Nature, was duly published in 1993. 
60. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP, MANAGING TOURISM IN NATURAL 
HERITAGE SITES, 13 (1993). For an illustration of this phenomenon see Tracey L-D. Lu, 
The Management of Two World Heritage Sites: Xidi and Hongcun in Anhui, China, in 
WORLD HERITAGE: GLOBAL CHALLENGES, LOCAL SOLUTIONS 87 (Roger White & John 
Carmen eds., 2007). That recognition of a site can bring increased tourism revenues has 
been questioned in Clem Tisdell & Clevo Wilson, World Heritage Listing of Australian 
Natural Sites: Tourism Stimulus and its Economic Value 32(2) ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 
27 (2002). 
61. For an illustration of branding in operation, see J. Rodger, World Heritage Site 
Branding – The Blaenavon Experience, in WORLD HERITAGE: GLOBAL CHALLENGES, 
LOCAL SOLUTIONS 13 (R. White & J. Carmen eds., 2007). 
62. Other MEAs “brand” areas protected under their auspices, e.g. Ramsar 
Wetlands, but these are less exclusive and may be harder to market as they do not 
explicitly suggest an exceptional experience for visitors. 
63. WHC, supra note 1, at Art. 15. 
64. LYSTER, supra note 3, at 229. Although writing at a time when establishing a 
funding stream was rarely given due consideration under MEAs as they then operated, 
the WHC’s arrangements remain important to the system. 
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parties, supplemented by gifts from other states,65 private parties or 
UNEP bodies, and cash from fundraising activities.66 The contributions 
of the contracting parties are compulsory under Article 16(1) except 
where a party declares at the time of ratification, accession, or 
acceptance, that it shall not be bound by that obligation.67 However, 
where such a declaration has been made, the relevant state party is still 
expected to make voluntary contributions equivalent to those the state 
would have been obligated to make had no declaration been made.68 In 
practice, equal pressure is brought to bear on states that are late making 
their payments, whether voluntary or obligatory.69 The total income 
generated according to this method is around US$4 million per year.70 
The purpose of the World Heritage Fund is to support applications 
made by state parties for assistance under Article 13(1). Applications are 
submitted to the Committee and may be made with respect to listed sites, 
or to those sites that will potentially be included in either the World 
Heritage List or the Danger List.71 The assistance granted may support 
preparatory measures (such as preparing tentative lists), training, 
technical help, or emergency action.72 For example, at the 2007 General 
Session of the Committee, US$59,600 was allocated to India for a 
regional training workshop on the conservation and management of 
Central-Asian and Mogul architecture.73 During the same session, 
US$65,780 was awarded to Vietnam to help build management capacity 
within the Ha Long Bay World Heritage Site.74 
Access to assistance through the fund is an incentive for developing 
states to seek inscription of properties in the World Heritage List. The 
 
65. For example, Austria made a number of voluntary contributions before 
becoming a state party. 
66. WHC, supra note 1, at Art. 15(3). 
67. Id. at Arts. 16(1), 16(2). 
68. Id. at Art. 16(4). 
69. See, e.g., Report of the 8th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, 
¶¶ 28-31. 
70. UNESCO, Benefits of Ratification, http://whc.unesco.org/en/164 (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2009). Ideally, the fund benefits most when there are a large number of 
developed nations involved as contracting parties who can be called upon to make 
contributions. These will be substantial when set at one percent of their compulsory 
UNESCO contribution. Conversely, they in turn are less likely to draw upon the fund 
themselves. 
71. WHC, supra note 1, at Art. 13(1). 
72. WHC, supra note 1, at Art. 15(4); Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶¶ 236-241. 
73. Decisions Adopted at the 31st Session of the World Heritage Committee, 
Decision 31COM18A (Christchurch 2007), available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/ 
sessions/31COM > page 197. 
74. Id. 
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assistance they receive is likely to be greater in value than the 
contribution they are expected to make to the fund.75 In turn, developed 
states, which bear the main burden of sustaining the fund, are assured 
that the distribution of support is conducted in an independent and 
transparent manner by the elected Committee. 
Thus, WHC membership provides not only esteem and tourism 
opportunities, but also capacity building options via appeals to the World 
Heritage Fund. Further, like admittance to the World Heritage List, the 
allocation of those funds is controlled by the Committee. 
B. Political Benefits 
The heightened status of a site that has been inscribed on the World 
Heritage List not only helps in terms of national esteem and visitor 
perception, but can also be utilized at the governmental level. The 
position of environmental ministries in intra-governmental policy 
deliberations can be strengthened through listing, particularly when the 
Committee considers a property to be in danger. In 2000, the Ecuadorian 
Minister for the Environment noted the significance of such political 
benefits in consideration of the state of conservation for Sangay National 
Park: 
the inclusion of the Sangay National Park in the List of World 
Heritage in Danger had helped the Ministry of Environment in 
negotiations with the Ministry [of] Public Works and other 
Government bodies to obtain resources to evaluate environmental 
impacts of the Guamote Macas Road and plan mitigation measures.76 
In development-versus-nature protection debates, international 
listing and recognition of a natural area may tip the balance in favor of 
protection. Conceivably, such recognition might also help environmental 
ministries annex a greater share of government spending. In both 
instances, the favoring of environmental policies seems more likely 
where the alternative might expose the government to critical comment 
from the international community. Indeed, the possibility of such 
exposure is heightened by listing. 
 
75. The amounts due have always been set at one percent of a state’s regular 
contributions to the budget of UNESCO, which is in turn set according to a scale where 
the developed states pay more. 
76. 24th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, ¶ VIII.7, available at 
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2000/whc-00-conf204-21e.pdf. Also see LYSTER, supra 
note 3, at 216, for a discussion of the political benefits gained by Darien National Park in 
Panama when it was awarded World Heritage status. 
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IV. THE COMMITTEE, SELF-INTEREST, AND 
COMPLIANCE PULL 
On their own, it is unlikely that these benefits would exert a strong 
pull towards compliance; in other words, these benefits would not limit 
states’ freedom to choose between compliance and non-compliance. 
Admittedly, channeling increased tourist revenues back into the running 
of heritage sites, or availing financial resources offered via the World 
Heritage Fund, might improve or help to maintain the condition of an 
area through increased management capacity. In both cases, the benefits 
should increase compliance with the obligations contained in Article 4. 
However, in isolation there can be no suggestion that the election to 
apply for such assistance or to reinvest revenue is in any way 
involuntary. 
In contrast, this Article argues that states electing to take measures 
that bring them into compliance are doing so partly because the 
Convention generates a force that pulls them towards that decision.77 
That force flows from the WHC’s allocation of control over access to 
benefits. More particularly, the executive powers over initial access to 
benefits, the award of grants from the fund, and the power to remove 
access to benefits altogether lie with the Committee rather than with the 
state parties. This has led to the WHC being able to set up a system for 
drawing states into compliance by encouraging either a real or perceived 
association between cooperation, performance of obligations, and 
furthering one’s own national interests. These treaty-generated forces 
undermine the notion of unfettered freedom in decision making and 
suggest a sense of coercion based upon self-interest. 
 
77. Mitchell notes that disagreements exist between “realists” and “institutionalists” 
as to whether or not nations and their citizens adjust their behavior to comply with 
environmental obligations simply because of the convention concluded. Indeed, the 
realists suggest that only considerations of state power (rather than law) determine the 
degree of compliance by a contracting party. The institutionalists, while still accepting 
that outside factors can affect compliance, insist that a treaty can also influence behavior. 
They therefore seek to identify the features of a norm or process which generate such an 
effect. R. B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 4, and 16 (J. Cameron et al. eds., 1996). 
Space dictates that this is a debate that should be noted, rather than explored in full; 
however, it is at least necessary to acknowledge that it is to the latter philosophy that this 
Article belongs. The stated aim from the outset has been to identify, highlight, and 
critique those features of the WHC which generate a pull towards compliance. This 
implicitly accepts that the existence of treaty induced compliance phenomena is at least 
possible. 
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A. Self-Interest and International Environmental Law 
Appealing to states’ desires to further their own interests plays an 
important part in a number of MEAs. This commonality takes a number 
of forms. One of the main techniques promotes openness as to the 
activities of contracting parties under the particular MEA. This can be 
achieved through monitoring or by maintaining a publicly available 
inventory of sites regulated under an MEA. Activity or inactivity, as 
exposed by monitoring or lists, can then be discussed in meetings of the 
parties or highlighted in local media. As Ronald Mitchell recognizes, 
states “may fear adverse public opinion, domestically or 
internationally.”78 These mechanisms can compel states to comply with 
their obligations as a defense to any possible condemnation. In other 
words, compliance can be brought about by actions motivated by the 
desire to maintain a positive public perception. 
While the WHC ultimately goes further with the pull of self-interest 
than other MEAs, this instrument also incorporates mechanisms to 
increase transparency, such as the World Heritage List.79 Monitoring is 
also conducted in two ways: institutional reporting and reactive 
monitoring. The latter is particularly interesting in the context of this 
Article.80 Reactive monitoring has been encouraged since the seventh 
meeting of the Committee in 1983.81 With respect to natural properties, 
reactive monitoring includes the creation of reports by IUCN (as the 
competent advisory body to the WHC on natural heritage) on specific 
 
78. Id. at 8. See generally LYSTER, supra note 3, at 12-13; PHILLIPPE SANDS, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 181 (2d ed. 2003). 
79. As entry to the World Heritage List is controlled by an independent screening 
process, this inventory is not a perfect gauge of the level of commitment from contracting 
parties. The tentative lists are far more useful in this regard, but there has been varied 
success in relation to their appropriate completion and submission. 
80. As to the former, since 1982, the Committee sought to introduce systematic 
(institutionalized) forms of reporting and, after initial resistance, its wishes were finally 
satisfied in 1999. Summary Report of the 11th General Assembly of States Parties to the 
Convention, ¶¶ 22-25, Doc. WHC-97/CONF.205/7 (Dec. 18, 1997). Institutional 
reporting initially concerns national measures. These involve frequent and regular 
monitoring of individual sites by heritage managers, with the information on all sites in 
turn collected and processed by a centralized administrative body at the national level. 
Report of the 17th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, ¶ 2, Doc. WHC-
93/CONF.002/14 (Dec. 1993). This data can then also feed into periodic reports 
submitted by states to the Committee. Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶ 203. These are 
gathered on a regional basis and have so far been collated for the Latin American, Arabic, 
Asian and African, and European and North American contracting parties. However, the 
institutional reporting program under the WHC is in its infancy and is somewhat over-
shadowed by the way in which reactive monitoring is employed. 
81. Report of the 7th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, ¶ 41, 
Doc. SC/83/CONF.009/8 (Jan. 1984). 
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dangers to World Heritage Sites.82 These reports can be thought of as 
reactive since they are the response to alerts about developments within 
the contracting party states, conveyed to IUCN or convention bodies by 
individuals. For example, IUCN has volunteers across the globe who 
monitor national developments and pass on information to the 
organization’s central staff. As the organization pointed out in 1985, its 
capacity to monitor is significant and stems from over 4,000 voluntary 
correspondents located in 126 states.83 
B. The Committee and Self-Interest 
The Committee stands in an atypical position when compared to 
institutional arrangements under other MEAs. Much of the coordination 
and significant administration of other MEAs is conducted through 
conferences of all the contracting parties (“COPs”). Such COPs may 
have authority to approve work programs, monitor implementation, and 
issue recommendations or resolutions. Executive power under these 
conventions therefore lies collectively with all of the contracting parties. 
On the other hand, under the WHC, the Committee (comprised of 
only twenty-one members)84 possesses executive power. Under the 
Convention, COPs do still occur (every two years during UNESCO 
General Conferences) but these are separate and principally concerned 
with setting the level of contributions to the fund, and electing new 
members to vacant seats on the Committee.85 This leaves the Committee 
with the majority of the responsibility for operating the Convention, 
which includes reviewing implementation, allocating funds, updating the 
Guidelines, formulating strategic objectives, and maintaining the various 
lists.86 The legal advisor to UNESCO recognized the distinctiveness of 
this delegation of power in 2000 when he advised that the World 
Heritage Convention is different from many other international 
conventions in that all the substantive powers are designated to the 
Committee and not to the General Assembly.87 
 
82. As envisaged in the Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶¶ 169-176. 
83. Report of the 9th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, ¶ 16, 
Doc. SC-85/CONF.008/9 (Dec. 1985). 
84. WHC, supra note 1, Art. 8(1). 
85. Id. 
86. For a more detailed list see Scovazzi, supra note 54, at 150. 
87. Report of the 24th Session of the Bureau to the World Heritage Committee, 
VI.7(1.1) Doc. WHC-2000/CONF.202/17 (Aug. 2000). For a detailed account of the 
power politics between the COP and the Committee, see Zacharias, supra note 21, 1841-
1842. 
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This independence generates interesting possibilities for the 
capacity of the WHC to pull states towards compliance with its 
obligations. The Committee has a significant impact upon the interests of 
states in a situation where the latter ultimately have no control over their 
own treatment. This set-up gives the Committee the capacity to apply 
pressure in order to enforce commitments. 
To explain this phenomenon, it is first apt to reemphasize the extent 
to which the Committee controls access to the benefits under the WHC. 
This is either through initial approval of a contracting party’s application 
for a site to be inscribed on the World Heritage List, or through the 
power to unilaterally delete a site from the list and therefore withdraw 
those benefits. Further, the Committee approves funding applications 
made by contracting parties. 
Secondly, the Committee also has significant opportunities to take 
steps that might politically embarrass states. At the extreme, this would 
take the form of striking a site from the list. More commonly, this 
involves listing a site on the Danger List. While inclusion on the Danger 
List is supposed to be a step towards securing priority in receiving 
assistance rather than a sanction, in practice inclusion has had a mixed 
reception. Some states willingly seek listing in order to obtain such 
assistance and priority attention. Others are less receptive to the list 
largely because they perceive listing as humiliating and contrary to their 
best interest.88 
Given the latter factor, the question of whether a site may be listed 
against the wishes of a state party has been debated.89 Although the 
matter has not been conclusively determined, the UNESCO legal advisor 
to the 26th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee provided 
advice on the matter in 2002. The advisor’s opinion suggested that the 
interpretation that accords best with the WHC’s text is that, in the 
ordinary course of affairs, inclusion should be initiated by the contracting 
party.90 However, in the case of urgent need, a property can be included 
based on a decision of the World Heritage Committee alone.91 This is 
because the concluding sentence of Article 11(4) states that the 
 
88. T. Atherton & T. C. Atherton, The Power and the Glory: National Sovereignty 
and the World Heritage Convention 69 AUSTRALIAN L. J. 631, 640 (1995); Jane. R. 
Vernhes, Implementation of the World Heritage Convention in South East Asia and the 
Pacific, in CRITICAL ISSUES FOR PROTECTED AREAS PART 1: WORLD HERITAGE SESSION 26 
(Workshop Papers from the 18th General Assembly of IUCN, 1991). 
89. The debate is important since the preservation of honor may be at the expense of 
mobilizing international assistance to the detriment of the site concerned. It also, of 
course, has a large bearing on the degree of power invested in the Committee. 
90. Summary Record of the 26th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage 
Committee, ¶ 12.1 Doc.WHC-02/CONF.202/INF.15 (June 2002). 
91. Id. 
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“Committee may at any time, in case of urgent need, make a new entry in 
the List of World Heritage in Danger and publicize such entry 
immediately.”92 Indeed, non-consensual listings have been made in the 
past. For example, following unanswered calls for information to the 
Indian Government, the Manas Nature Reserve was included in the 
Danger List in 1992.93 
The Committee therefore exists as an authoritative and independent 
body with the ability to make significant decisions affecting the interests 
of the state parties. Given these powers, states are understandably 
cautious about possible public withdrawal or withholding of future 
benefits should they act inconsistently with their obligations under the 
WHC.94 Consequently, by exploiting such associations, the WHC and its 
Committee can exert a pull towards compliance. This may often take 
place without any noticeable intervention from the Committee. 
Nevertheless, where states appear to be erring in their management of 
heritage sites, the Committee’s position allows it to be proactive in 
placing demands upon contracting parties. If these demands are duly 
complied with, the level of protection a site under threat enjoys should 
increase. This will then draw the state back into compliance. This 
combination of executive authority and state caution which promotes and 
supports the Committee’s active intervention highlights one of the 
strongest aspects of the WHC, and is best illustrated by the following 
examples. 
C. Intervention and Compliance Pull in Action 
On April 8, 2007, a delegation from the Committee visited the 
Galapagos Islands, a World Heritage Site since 1978.95 This visit was 
further evidence of a step-change in the nature of the over-seeing of the 
 
92. The Guidelines seem to widen the interpretation of UNESCO’s legal advisor. 
They confirm the view that the Committee may inscribe a property on the Danger List 
when four requirements are met, with one of the requirements being that assistance has 
been requested. However, that “assistance may be requested by any Committee member 
or the Secretariat.” Guidelines, supra note 26, at ¶ 177(d). For full debate on the issue see 
Buzzini and Condorelli, supra note 54, at 195-96, who reach the same conclusion as 
UNESCO’s legal advisor. 
93. Report of the 16th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, 
¶¶ VIII.13, X.1.E.A., Doc.WHC.92/CONF.002/12 (Dec. 1992). 
94. In the context of fears about “free-riding” by states under a convention, Mitchell 
asserts that this can be overcome “if states view the benefits they derive in other existing 
and future international agreements as conditional upon a record of compliance.” 
Mitchell, supra note 77, at 11. 
95. The decision to inscribe is recorded in Report of the 2nd Ordinary Session of the 
World Heritage Committee, ¶ 38, Doc. CC-78/CONF.010/10 Rev. (Oct. 1978). 
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islands by the Committee; a change that had begun the previous year.96 
Although the islands had long been designated as a World Heritage Site 
under the WHC, threats to the conservation of the islands had been 
growing. Once an isolated realm rich in endemic species, the islands 
have increasingly shown worrying signs of ecosystem mutation caused 
by the introduction of alien species.97 Further stress is being placed upon 
the islands by an expanding tourist industry and a boom in the size of the 
resident human population.98 
Since the mid-1990’s, the leadership of the WHC had been aware of 
these issues via reactive monitoring reports. The islands were regularly 
considered for inclusion in the Danger List, but the Ecuadorian 
Government tended to resist this step.99 Such a move was initially 
delayed in 1998 with the enactment by the state of a special law on the 
preservation and sustainable use of the Galapagos.100 However, the 2005 
reactive monitoring reports indicated that the special law was proving 
hard to implement mainly due to difficulties in appointing a long-term 
park director.101 In addition, immigration continued subject only to weak 
controls, and there were tensions undermining what should have been a 
 
96. Report of the 19th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, 
¶ VII.13, Doc. WHC-95/CONF.203/16 (Dec. 1995). 
97. By way of illustration, scientists have observed the presence of non-indigenous 
parasitic fly larvae in nests of the various species of Darwin finches on the islands, which 
also have human habitation. See Birgit Fessl & Sabine Tebbich, Philornis Downsi – a 
Recently Discovered Parasite on the Galápagos Archipelago – a Threat for Darwin’s 
Finches? 144 IBIS 445, 450 (2002). The threat from these larvae may, in combination 
with predation from another alien species (the black rat) and habitat destruction by the 
human population, result in one species of this iconic bird species becoming extinct, 
namely the Mangrove Finch. See Jonathan Amos, Darwin Finches at Risk, BBC NEWS 
ONLINE, November 8, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/2415261.stm 
(quoting Nigel Collar of Birdlife International). 
98. It has been estimated that the number of tourists has increased by 100,000 over 
the last 30 years to 120,000, while the local population has increased by 14,500 from a 
figure of 3,500 over the same time period. Tom Leonard, Race to Protect the Galapagos 
Islands, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 12, 2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/worldnews/1548411/Race-to-protect-the-Galapagos-islands.html. 
99. See Report of 19th Ordinary Session, supra note 96, ¶ VII.13, for early 
appreciation of the problems and an initial call for recognition that the islands were in 
danger. 
100. Special Regime Law for the Preservation and Sustainable Development of the 
Province of Galapagos, Law No. 278 (Official Registry of Ecuador) which entered into 
force on March 18, 1998. 
101. The position of Park Director has caused serious conflict between fishermen 
and park wardens, with the government being accused by conservationists of removing 
one director in favor of a pro-fishermen office holder. See Strike Forces Galapagos Boss 
Out, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 28, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/ 
3696376.stm. 
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cooperative relationship between the fishing community, non-
governmental organizations, and other local stakeholders.102 This led to a 
request by the Committee for Ecuador to host a mission to the islands to 
assess the problem, which took place in March 2006.103 
At the subsequent Committee meeting in Vilnius, the Ecuadorian 
Government was made the subject of onerous requests due to the 
concerns within the Committee about the islands. The Committee 
requested that, in cooperation with IUCN and the World Heritage Centre 
(the secretariat to the WHC), Ecuador organize a multi-stakeholder 
meeting to develop a program for the future of the islands.104 The 
purpose of the meeting was to agree to targets and timeframes for 
addressing the problems against which progress could be measured.105 
Naturally, such targets could also be monitored by the international 
community, although no such monitoring was explicitly referenced. The 
decision went on to catalog in detail the failings in the current 
administration of the islands that would need to be addressed.106 Finally, 
a request was made for Ecuador to invite a joint IUCN/World Heritage 
Committee mission to participate in the meeting, which would cover the 
issues listed.107 No doubt involvement with this joint mission would give 
the two bodies the opportunity to check that such discussions actually 
occurred and to learn more about the situation on the ground. 
The joint mission took place in April 2007 and the Ecuadorian 
Government duly organized the stakeholder meetings requested on the 
islands.108 Simultaneously, the President of Ecuador declared that the 
island was at risk, a priority for national action, and that among a number 
of remedial measures, he was considering the suspension of some 
tourism permits.109 This move may have been an attempt to portray the 
Ecuadorian Government as acting on its own initiative, rather than being 
 
102. Id. See also Decisions Adopted at the 30th Session of the World Heritage 
Committee, ¶ 29, Doc. WHC-06/30.COM/19 (July 2006). 
103. See Summary Record of the 30th Session of the World Heritage Committee, at 
95, Doc. WHC-06/30.COM/INF.19 (July 2006). 
104. World Heritage Committee Decision, ¶ 8, 30COM7B.29, State of 
Conservation (Galápagos Islands), available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/ 
1114/. 
105. Id. 
106. These failings include the increasing number of access points to the islands by 
air and sea, the ongoing presence of illegal immigrants, fishing in “a regulatory vacuum,” 
uncontrolled tourist access, and inadequate control and inspection at island entry points. 
Id. ¶¶ 8(a), (d), (e), (f) and (k), respectively. 
107. Id. ¶ 9. 
108. Press Release, UNESCO World Heritage Centre, UNESCO Mission Confirms 
Threat to the Galapagos Islands, No. 2007-38 (Apr. 17, 2007). 
109. Leonard, supra note 98. 
178 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y [Vol. 20:2 
forced into this position. After all, it was becoming increasingly clear 
that the Committee would make a decision confirming the perilous state 
of the islands following the visit.110 Indeed, just over two months later, at 
the 31st Session of the World Heritage Committee in Christchurch, the 
islands were recorded as being officially in danger under the WHC.111 
The Galapagos example illustrates the level of pro-active and 
intrusive intervention the Committee is comfortable making, and the 
willingness of countries like Ecuador to cooperate with this external 
body. It is contended that this is in part generated by the careful balance 
of power over access to, and potential public withdrawal of, the benefits 
mentioned above. However, this is not an isolated example. 
In 1999, IUCN reported that Komodo National Park in Indonesia 
was subject to increases in illegal dynamite and cyanide fishing causing 
damage to the coral reefs in the World Heritage Site. The Committee 
requested the Indonesians permit a monitoring mission to the park in 
order to assess the damage and to review current management of the 
site.112 Although the Indonesian government initially proposed sending 
their own mission to study the problem,113 a joint IUCN/UNESCO 
mission was ultimately given access to the park to conduct its own 
assessment.114 
Some of the Committee’s requests might also amount to strict 
ultimatums. For example, the City of Dresden and Elbe Valley was 
recognized as a World Heritage Site in 2004 in light of its cultural 
value.115 However, just two years later the Committee issued a warning 
to Germany that if the city municipality continued with plans to build a 
motorway bridge over the river and into the heart of the city, the site 
would become the first in the history of the WHC to be struck from the 
World Heritage List. Just ten days later, the city council voted to stop 
imminent construction and review the project.116 
 
110. Id. (quoting President Rafael Correa: “We do not need studies from some 
international organisation. We are declaring the Galapagos at risk"). 
111. World Heritage Committee Decision 31COM7B.35 – Galapagos Islands 
(Ecuador), available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/1416/. 
112. The Report of the Bureau to the World Heritage Committee, 23rd Sess., 
¶ IV.34, Doc. WHC-99/CONF.204/15 (July 1999). 
113. Report of the 23rd Extraordinary Session of the Bureau to the World Heritage 
Committee, Natural Heritage, pt.(iii), Doc. WHC-99/CONF.208/8 (Nov. 1999) (the 
Committee responded by requesting that their findings be forwarded to it). 
114. As recorded in the Report of the 24th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage 
Committee, Annex X, Doc. WHC-2000/CONF.204/21 (Dec. 2000). 
115. Decision 28COM14B.40, Nominations of Properties to the World Heritage 
List, adopted at the 28th Session of the World Heritage Committee, Doc. WHC-
04/28.COM/26 (July 2004). 
116. Press Release, UNESCO World Heritage Centre, Dresden City Council Votes 
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In addition, the Committee has been willing to make 
recommendations outside of its monitoring functions. For example, when 
the Great Barrier Reef was inscribed on the World Heritage List, the 
Committee noted that only a small portion of the area nominated for 
protection under the WHC was included within the Great Barrier Reef 
Region for purposes of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Act.117 Consequently, the Committee requested that Australia ensure that 
the whole area to be inscribed on the World Heritage List also be 
protected by the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act.118 As Lyster notes: 
Undoubtedly stimulated by the new international status to be given to 
the [Great] Barrier Reef, the Prime Minister of Australia assured the 
1981 meeting of the World Heritage Committee that the “Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park will be progressively extended. The 
question is not whether but when.”119 
D. Summary 
The fact that the Committee can make such onerous and intrusive 
demands without being roundly ignored by the contracting parties raises 
two points. First, such requests can stop activities that threaten heritage 
sites, thereby halting a state’s descent into breach of obligations and non-
compliance. 
 
Against Bridge Construction at World Heritage Site (July 21, 2006). No alternative plans 
have yet been produced and the regional government has begun construction. This is in 
apparent discordance with the national government’s wishes given that there is some 
evidence the national government would be happy to meet the costs of a tunnel option. 
Giovanni Boccardi & Jaroslav Kilian, Report: Reinforced Monitoring Mission to the 
Dresden Elbe Valley World Heritage Property, 11- 12 (Feb. 2008). The issue has 
therefore exposed problems with the implementation of the convention within the federal 
system. Nevertheless, the Committee issued a further ultimatum in July 2008 that unless 
construction is halted and remedial action taken, the site will be delisted in 2009. 
Decision 32COM7A.26 adopted at the 32nd Session of the World Heritage Committee, 
Doc. WHC-08/32.COM/24 (July 2008). On a recent visit to the site in November 2008, 
the author observed continuing construction, indicating that the most likely outcome will 
be delisting, and thus (in the author’s opinion) placing the state in apparent breach of 
Article 4. 
117. The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act, 1975, No. 85 (Austl.). 
118. Report of the 5th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, 
¶ VIII.15, Doc. CC-81/CONF/003/6 (Oct 1981). 
119. LYSTER, supra note 3, at 217. New sections were added to the marine park in 
the 1980s, thus meeting the Committee’s request. REVIEW OF THE GREAT BARRIER REEF 
MARINE PARK ACT 1975, 28-29 (2006), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/ 
coasts/publications/pubs/gbr-marine-park-act.pdf. 
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Second, the phenomenon reflects the “gatekeeper” functions of the 
Committee,120 which can be used to exert a force upon state parties, 
pulling them towards compliance. Part of the origin of this force is the 
fact that the Committee is an independent, limited membership, 
executive body with real powers of control. Its powers can affect the 
contracting states’ abilities to advance their own self-interest in a myriad 
of ways, ranging from the Committee’s authority over initial availability 
of the substantial benefits offered by the World Heritage brand to the 
threat of danger listing and de-listing with their attendant negative 
publicity. 
Exploiting such self-interest can be a powerful tool. Mitchell notes 
that treaty influenced behavior is dominated by a logic of 
consequences.121 This logic describes instrumental calculations by states 
as to how their possible actions will help or harm their interests.122 The 
WHC has therefore inserted itself into the logic of consequences for 
conserving and protecting the world’s heritage in a powerful way. 
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE OBSERVATIONS 
So far this Article has focused upon the manner in which the WHC 
can pull states towards compliance. In summary, it has been argued that 
this is achieved via the Convention’s devolution to the limited 
membership Committee of power over access to benefits, and over 
sanctions that bring real economic and political consequences. What is 
then surprising is that the WHC is rarely featured in academic writing on 
non-compliance systems employed under MEAs. Tullio Scovazzi, 
Gionata Buzzini, and Luigi Condorelli have recently provided excellent 
descriptions of the functioning of the Convention and the Committee;123 
however, they do not explore the effects of this upon state compliance. 
This might be assumed to be because such a structure is not unusual, but 
the following comparative analysis in Subpart A below demonstrates the 
opposite, namely that the devolution of power over compliance review 
and sanctions to the Committee is very unusual. 
Nevertheless, once this comparative analysis has revealed that the 
WHC is atypical in the technique it employs to further compliance, the 
utility of this fact might still be questioned. This is because it has been 
 
120. Metaphor adopted from Affolder, supra note 22, at 38. 
121. Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: Compliance, Effectiveness, and 
Behaviour Change in International Environmental Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 893, 901 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). 
122. Id. 
123. Scovazzi, supra note 54; Buzzini & Condorelli, supra note 54. 
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suggested that full compliance does not necessarily equate to effective 
action.124 Consequently, in Subpart B to this Part of the Article, it will be 
argued that the devolution of powers to the Committee, and the nature of 
those powers, goes some way to ensuring that compliant action is also 
effective in meeting the Convention’s objectives. 
A. Comparison to Other MEAs 
Because recourse to international courts is often an unsatisfactory 
option for breach of international environmental laws in general, and 
MEAs in particular,125 Lyster notes that administrative and non-judicial 
mechanisms can be more effective for ensuring compliance.126 He goes 
on to observe that even a simple measure providing for regular COPs can 
prevent an MEA from being neglected by state parties and thus being 
reduced to a “sleeping treaty.”127 More sophisticated supervisory 
techniques have also been developed over the last half-century128 and are 
commonly employed to ensure compliance. These include monitoring 
and reporting, data collection and verification, and inspection.129 Indeed, 
many of these techniques can be found under the WHC as described in 
Part IV.A. above. 
Less frequently encountered are mechanisms for resolving instances 
of non-compliance under regularized procedures—termed “non-
compliance procedures” (“NCPs”).130 Ideally, NCPs comprise the latter 
stage of a compliance continuum, with supervisory techniques feeding 
into an institutional structure designed to control implementation and 
compliance.131 As described earlier in the Article, through the marriage 
 
124. See D. G. Victor et al, Introduction and Overview in THE IMPLEMENTATION 
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 1, 7 (DAVID G. VICTOR et al. eds., 1998). 
125. BIRNIE et al., supra note 15, at 237-239. 
126. LYSTER, supra note 3, at 12. 
127. Id. 
128. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 659, 679 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998). 
129. BIRNIE et al., supra note 15, 242-245. 
130. Seven NCPs have been agreed upon since 1990, and another three are currently 
under negotiation. Jutta Brunnée, Enforcement Mechanisms in International Law and 
International Environmental Law, in ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND ACADEMIA 1, 
18 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 2006). 
131. M. A. Fitzmaurice & C. Redgwell, Environmental Non-Compliance 
Procedures and International Law, XXXI NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 35, 42 (2000). 
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of reactive monitoring and the allocation of powers and time to the 
Committee to adjudicate at their annual sessions upon conservation 
reports produced by the IUCN, the WHC has adopted a very proactive 
NCP. Nevertheless, the following comparison to other MEAs that have 
adopted NCPs of their own will serve to underline the atypical nature of 
the WHC arrangements. This comparative analysis will begin by 
describing three commonalities relating to devolution, favoring 
management over sanctions, and using economic sanctions if needed. 
The comparative analysis then concludes by highlighting one key 
distinction between the WHC and these MEAs. 
1. Similarity: Devolved Responsibility to Limited 
Membership Body 
As mentioned, NCPs have been incorporated into a number of MEA 
systems for reviewing implementation.132 Nevertheless, only a handful 
of these share a significant feature with the WHC by having devolved 
responsibility for their operation to subsidiary bodies outside of the COP. 
The five instances are: 
(1) the Implementation Committee to the Montreal Protocol133 
(2) the Implementation Committee to the 1979 Convention on 
Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (“LRTAP”)134 
(3) the Compliance Committee to the Protocol to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“Kyoto 
Protocol”)135 
(4) the Standing Committee to CITES136 
 
132. Brunnée, supra note 130, at 17-18. 
133. Montreal Protocol, supra note 20, Art. 8; the committee being established 
under the non-compliance procedure devised under Decision III/20 and amended under 
Decision X/10. 
134. Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, November 13, 1979, 
18 I.L.M. 1442 (entered into force 16 Mar. 1983) [hereinafter LRTAP]. The committee 
was created pursuant to Decision 1997/2 of the Executive Body to the convention. 
135. Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 11, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force 16 Feb. 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. The 
committee was created under the Protocol pursuant to Decision 24/CP. 7. 
136. The authority of the committee in relation to NCP functions is provided for in 
Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Resolution Conf. 11.1 (Apr. 2000) 
(amended at the 12th, 13th and 14th meetings of the Conference of the Parties), available 
at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/11/11-01R14.shtml (describing the authority of the 
committee in relation to NCP functions). 
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(5) the Compliance Committee to the Aarhus Convention137 
Table 1 
MEA 










10 members elected from the 191 
contracting parties on the basis of an 
equitable geographical distribution. 
LRTAP Implementation Committee 






20 members chosen from the 180 
contracting parties split equally 
between two branches. Each branch to 
have one representative for each of the 
five official UN regions, one from the 
small island developing states, and two 
each from Annex I and non-Annex I 
Parties. 
CITES Standing Committee 
Currently 18 members elected from the 
172 contracting parties on the basis of 
equitable regional representation 
according to the proportion of 





8 members of a nationality of a 
contracting party but elected to act in 
their personal capacity. 
 
These five MEAs have been the focus of much academic writing on 
NCPs, whether as exemplars or because of their relative novelty in terms 
of design.138 Interestingly, as described below, these noted conventions 
share further similarities to the WHC, leading to puzzlement over the 
failure to consider the WHC in academic research into compliance 
mechanisms. It was noted that the Committee to the WHC is a limited 
membership body—twenty-one seats are filled by representatives of 
states elected from the 185 contracting parties, who hold office for a 
 
137. Aarhus Convention, supra note 19, Art. 15 and Decision I/7. 
138. See, e.g., BIRNIE et al., supra note 15, at 245-250; SANDS, supra note 78, 205-
210; ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A 
DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND ACADEMIA (ULRICH BEYERLIN et al. eds., 2006). 
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fixed number of years.139 This form of limited membership is also found 
in the Montreal Protocol, LRTAP, the Kyoto Protocol, the Aarhus 
Convention,140 and CITES. The details are given above in Table 1. The 
significance of this limited membership is that progress in evaluating 
potential cases of non-compliance is beyond the direct influence of the 
state placed under the “spotlight.” Investigations and inquiries therefore 
remain practicable despite any opposition from that state. 
2. Similarity: Non-Confrontational Solutions 
Another similarity between the WHC and the NCPs under the five 
MEAs noted above occurs when the respective committees face a case of 
non-compliance: the NCPs of both the WHC and the other MEAs 
envisage non-confrontational managerial solutions, as well as 
confrontational punitive steps.141 For example, the Kyoto Protocol splits 
its Compliance Committee into two branches: the Facilitative Branch and 
the Enforcement Branch.142 Another example of an MEA with both 
confrontational and non-confrontational procedures is the Montreal 
Protocol under which the measures that can be recommended by its 
Implementation Committee are listed as: providing appropriate 
assistance, issuing cautions, and suspending rights and privileges under 
the agreement.143 
Support for favoring management rather than sanction seems to be 
given particular emphasis in two of these regimes—the Montreal 
Protocol and LRTAP. The former Executive Secretary to the Ozone 
Secretariat, K. Madhava Sarma, has highlighted the favoring of 
assistance and cautioning under the Montreal Protocol.144 Similarly, the 
 
139. Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶ 21. 
140. It is worth noting that it is in relation to the composition of the Aarhus 
Convention Compliance Committee that this treaty has received particular mention. As 
Svitlana Kravchenko (the current vice-chair of the committee) has pointed out, members 
act in their personal capacity (rather than being representatives of the States), which 
increases continuity in the body’s composition from year to year because the States 
cannot easily remove or replace the members once elected. Additionally, NGOs can 
nominate up to two members for election. Svitlana Kravchenko, The Aarhus Convention 
and Innovations in Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 18 COLO. J. 
INT’L ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 12-16 (2007). 
141. These approaches are described in Raustiala & Victor, supra note 128, at 681. 
142. Established pursuant to Kyoto Protocol, supra note 135, at Article 18 and 
Decision 24/CP.7. 
143. Adopted pursuant to Decision IV/5 of the 4th Meeting of the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol. 
144. K. Madhava Sarma, Compliance with the Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements to Protect the Ozone Layer, in ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND ACADEMIA 
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Implementation Committee under LRTAP is supposed to seek a 
“constructive solution” to the incidence of non-compliance.145 Indeed, 
the only response explicitly mentioned under LRTAP is the provision of 
assistance.146 
A similar preference is evident in the practice of the Committee 
under the WHC. Instances of possible non-compliance are investigated 
through dialogue and site visits. Even danger listing is primarily and 
outwardly about prioritizing the allocation of resources to tackle threats. 
Indeed, the ultimate sanction of de-listing has only been used once, and 
the characterization of danger listing as a negative factor in the logic of 
consequences comes down to the personal stance of the state concerned. 
The presence of sanctions is important, but management and allocation 
of assistance remains the policy of choice. 
3. Similarity: Economic Sanctions 
A further significant similarity is that the threatened or deployed 
sanction predominantly results in denial of access to economic benefits. 
CITES is the classic example, with its use of trade suspensions. The 
established system allows legitimate trade in species based upon the 
issuing of permits by importing and/or exporting states. A 
recommendation that the contracting parties no longer accept export 
permits from a particular state because of a finding of non-compliance 
against that state carries very real “economic clout.”147 As Peter Sand 
observes, “CITES secures access to a very lucrative export market (up to 
$50 billion annually). . . [A]n embargo practically excludes the country 
concerned from all legitimate trade.”148 
Similarly, under the Montreal Protocol, the ultimate suspension of 
rights and privileges will deny a contracting party access to the financial 
benefits of legitimate trade in controlled substances, the sale of 
production quotas to other contracting parties, and rights to technology 
transfer and financial support.149 
Finally, the range of sanctions available to the Enforcement Branch 
of the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Committee includes a deduction of 
 
25, 38 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 2006). 
145. LRTAP Decision 1997/2, ¶ 3(b). 
146. Id. ¶ 1. See also, BIRNIE et al., supra note 15, at 247. 
147. Peter H. Sand, Sanctions in Case of Non-Compliance and State Responsibility: 
Pacta Sunt Servanda – or Else? in ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS – A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND ACADEMIA 
259, 263 (U. Beyerlin et al. eds., 2006). 
148. Id. 
149. Montreal Protocol Decision IV/18, supra note 143; Madhava Sarma, supra 
note 144, at 30-31. 
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thirty percent of a state’s yearly greenhouse gas emissions allowance—
which it could have traded to other states—or outright suspension from 
all emissions trading.150 
The judicious injection of economic factors into the logic of 
consequences for states’ decision making (which the WHC achieved 
through the availability of funds and the World Heritage “brand”) is 
therefore also found in CITES, the Montreal Protocol, and the Kyoto 
Protocol. Linking sanctions to the denial of access to economic benefits 
generates force that pulls states towards action in compliance with the 
treaties’ provisions. Given that this feature is found in the WHC, and 
given the other similarities noted to the Montreal Protocol, CITES, the 
Kyoto Protocol, the Aarhus Convention, and LRTAP, the NCP functions 
of the Committee deserve to be accorded the same recognition in 
compliance discourse. 
4. Difference: Ultimate Authority to Deal with Non-
Compliance 
There is, however, one final feature of the WHC system that makes 
it stand apart from even the five atypical MEAs. Under the WHC, the 
ultimate authority to deal with non-compliance lies with the Committee 
alone. This feature renders the degree of compliance pull much stronger. 
The clearest illustration of this can be seen with a comparative 
examination of the authority of the Implementation Committee to 
LRTAP. The Implementation Committee’s primary function is to 
investigate and report to the Executive Committee; the Implementation 
Committee may only make recommendations to the Executive 
Committee.151 The Executive Committee alone, comprised of all the 
contracting parties, is empowered to adopt the recommendations.152 As 
has been recognized, the decisions of that body require consensus, and 
can therefore easily be blocked.153 
The same situation exists with respect to the Montreal Protocol, 
where the Implementation Committee has an active role in investigation, 
but ultimately can only make a recommendation as to whether assistance, 
a caution, or suspension of privileges should be the course of action.154 
The authority to take such steps, or actually impose sanctions, lies with 
 
150. Kyoto Protocol Decision 24/CP.7, Part XV. 
151. LRTAP Decision 1997/2, ¶ 9. 
152. Id, ¶ 11. 
153. BIRNIE et al., supra note 15, at 247. 
154. Montreal Protocol, Non-Compliance Procedure adopted under Decision X/10, 
¶ 9. 
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the contracting parties acting on a two-thirds majority.155 Thus, the 
affected state will have a direct say in its treatment. 
Finally, the Aarhus Convention’s Compliance Committee has quite 
limited powers. It may approach states in order to provide advice and 
facilitate assistance, but needs the agreement of the state concerned to 
produce formal recommendations or request strategies for achieving 
compliance.156 Any sanction—such as a declaration of non-
compliance—needs to be taken by the COP.157 
A level of authority somewhat analogous to that enjoyed by the 
WHC’s Committee can be discerned under the Kyoto Protocol and 
CITES. Under the Kyoto Protocol, both the Facilitative and Enforcement 
Branches of the Compliance Committee have the authority to take action 
against a state.158 However, the NCP under the Kyoto Protocol allows a 
right of appeal to the COP in order to challenge a decision of the 
enforcement branch.159 Such a right of appeal indicates that ultimate 
authority over sanctions still lies with the contracting parties as a 
collective. 
Under CITES there is uncertainty as to the authority of the Standing 
Committee. This committee was initially established to assist with the 
running of the regime between COPs.160 Susan Biniaz asserts that the 
Standing Committee has therefore come to play an important role in 
receiving advice from the Secretariat and drafting recommendations on 
compliance issues, although “some are recommendations to the COP, 
some implement delegations from the COP, and some appear to be direct 
recommendations to the parties.”161 She goes on to note that with respect 
to recommendations for all contracting parties to embargo another state’s 
export permits, “In some cases, the Standing Committee itself has made 
 
155. Rules of Procedure of the Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Rule 
40(1). 
156. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE AND PROCEDURES 
FOR THE REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE, ¶ 36. (adopted pursuant to, and annexed to, Decision 
I/7, of the First Meeting of the Parties, Lucca, Italy, October 2002). “Recommendations” 
refer to the draft recommendations to be made to the COP. GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ON 
AARHUS CONVENTION COMPLIANCE MECHANISM, 18 (2006). 
157. Id. ¶ 37. For a detailed account see Kravchenko, supra note 140, at 28-31. 
158. Kyoto Protocol Decision 24/CP.7, Part XIV as regards the former, Part XV as 
regards the latter. 
159. Id., at Part IX. The COP can overturn the decision if there is a three-fourths 
majority. 
160. CITES Resolution Conf. 11.1, preamble, Rev. CoP14, available at 
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/11/11-01R14.shtml. 
161. Susan Biniaz, Remarks about the CITES Compliance Regime, in ENSURING 
COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A DIALOGUE 
BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND ACADEMIA 89, 93 n.20 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 2006). 
188 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y [Vol. 20:2 
direct recommendations for trade suspensions, apparently citing 
Resolution 11.3 as its legal basis; the Secretariat has called this authority 
‘questionable.’ ”162 
Peter Sand, a former Secretary-General to CITES, argued that 
recommendations for suspending trade needed to be adopted by a two-
thirds majority of the COP, or a majority of the Standing Committee if 
the authority had been delegated to them by the COP.163 Sand made this 
argument when guidelines restating the entire system were in 
preparation.164 Although the guidelines have since been adopted, the 
matter is still far from resolved. The new guidelines permit the Standing 
Committee to make trade suspension recommendations so far as they are 
“specifically and explicitly based on the Convention and on any 
applicable Resolutions and/or Decisions by the Conference of the 
Parties.”165 It is certainly arguable that any apparent allocation of 
ultimate sanctioning authority could still be limited by resolutions and 
decisions of the COP. Further, the new guidelines state that “[w]hen the 
Conference of the Parties decides to carry out itself the tasks delegated to 
the Standing Committee, it follows the same procedures as those 
described below for the Standing Committee.”166 
In earlier comments on the effect of this provision, the Chairman of 
the Working Group drafting the guidelines stated that this reflected the 
COP’s ultimate authority to “seize itself of any matter it pleases.”167 If 
this is the new approach, then the COP could seize responsibility for 
handling a case of non-compliance. The affected state does not have such 
a powerful right of appeal as per Kyoto, but neither is the power of the 
Standing Committee unlimited. This places CITES somewhere between 
the Kyoto Protocol and the WHC with respect to the limits of authority. 
Therefore, in one regard—namely, the ultimate power of the 
Committee—the WHC regime is exceptional, even when compared to 
those MEAs commonly discussed in research into compliance 
procedures.168 Including the WHC in future discourse on compliance 
would therefore be welcome. Particularly so when the similarities 
 
162. Id. at 94. Such recommendations do not require universal support from 
contracting parties in order to be effective sanctions. Sand, supra note 147, at 264. 
163. Sand, supra note 147, at 265-266. 
164. Id. 
165. Guide to CITES Compliance Procedures, Resolution Conf 14/3 (Annex) ¶ 30, 
available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/all/14/E14-03.pdf. 
166. Id. ¶ 11. 
167. CITES, Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention Compliance and 
Enforcement Issues, Report of the Standing Committee Working Group on Compliance, 
COP14 Doc 23, 4 (June 3-15, 2007). 
168. See generally sources cited supra note 138. 
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between the WHC and the Montreal Protocol, LRTAP, CITES, the 
Kyoto Protocol, and the Aarhus Convention are recalled. As was 
demonstrated, these similarities related to a comparable devolution of 
power over compliance to a limited membership body, which acted so as 
to prefer management over sanctions, but which still retained the option 
of pursuing economic sanctions if needed. 
B. Compliance and Effectiveness 
Despite the atypical features of the WHC, praising its degree of 
compliance pull is immaterial if it has no relation to effectiveness. As 
David Victor et al. assert, the fact that a state is acting in compliance 
with agreed conservation obligations does not necessarily indicate that 
the treaty is effective, which they define as resulting in changes in 
behavior that furthers the goals of a treaty. Victor et al. explain: 
“International environmental law is filled with examples of agreements 
that have had high compliance but limited influence on behavior. . . . 
Standards can be too weak, too strong, inefficient, or completely ill 
conceived.”169 
Initial reflection upon the key articles defining the obligations of the 
parties to the WHC might cause concern in this regard. Article 4 (the 
obligation to identify, conserve, protect, present and transmit to future 
generations) is predicated upon the basis that a state party will do “all it 
can to this end, to the utmost of its own resources.”170 Article 5 sets out 
the minimal action that must be taken to meet the aforementioned 
obligation, but requires only that states “endeavor” to take these steps “in 
so far as possible, and as appropriate for each country.”171 Objections 
could therefore be leveled at the Convention’s drafting, which would 
undermine the previously noted strengths. Such objections would assert 
that if the standard for compliance is so ambiguous and vague that 
charges of non-compliance are difficult to make, or if the standard for 
compliance is so low that it can be met simply by maintaining the status 
quo, then the WHC would fail to protect the world’s heritage and 
become ineffective. Professed compliance could lead to maintenance of 
the very status quo which threatened the world’s natural heritage in the 
first place. Nevertheless, for the following reasons, such objections 
should not generate undue concern. 
 
169. Victor et al., supra note 124, at 7. 
170. WHC, supra note 1, at Art. 4. 
171. Id. at Art. 5: “To ensure that effective and active measures are taken for the 
protection, conservation and preservation of the cultural and natural heritage situated on 
its territory, each State Party to this Convention shall endeavor, in so far as possible, and 
as appropriate for each country: . . .” 
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The pit-falls of placing too much emphasis upon compliance at the 
expense of studying the effectiveness of a regime is made clear by Victor 
et al.,172 and their observations deserve to be borne in mind. However, 
the powers of the World Heritage Committee go a long way towards 
averting this danger. The standards demanded of state parties under the 
World Heritage Convention are indeed indeterminate under Articles 4 
and 5. This then leaves states free to advocate for the standards to be 
viewed at a level that is cleared by their actions; however, their 
submissions do not conclusively determine that level. This is because it 
is only the World Heritage Committee’s view that is of any practical 
significance. After all, the Committee’s implementation responsibilities 
give it the means to reinforce its judgments on the expected standards. 
Additionally, the World Heritage Committee initiates and approves 
amendments to the Guidelines, and this document plays a key role in 
defining the substantive content of the Convention.173 
The Committee therefore has de facto authority to impose 
substantial and onerous obligations upon the state parties. Therefore, it 
has the means to ensure effective compliance. As has been seen in Part 
IV.C. above, the Committee’s views of what does and does not accord 
with the obligations under the WHC certainly seem to affect the behavior 
of states. Therefore, it is the limited membership committee, with its 
executive powers over benefits offered, which has the power to articulate 
the standards demanded so as to render the Convention effective. 
Without such a system, the obligations would have been so indeterminate 
that state parties could have projected their own interpretations onto the 
treaty to maintain a veneer of compliance. 
VI. AREAS FOR PRIORITY ACTION 
With extensive power over the normative content of the 
Convention, and the means to enforce its own interpretation of that 
normative content, the legitimacy of the Committee and its activities is 
vital. Indeed, Affolder suggests that much of the “paranoid lather” and 
talk of UN helicopters in relation to World Heritage sites can be traced to 
“the power of the autonomous World Heritage Committee and the fact 
 
172. See Victor et al., supra note 124. 
173. See also Zacharias, supra note 21, at 1846-51. In this respect, the WHC might 
share another common feature with the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee 
whose work, it is claimed by Kravchenko, has acted to define and clarify terms of that 
treaty in a fashion similar to case law. Kravchenko, supra note 140, at 5. However, as 
Kravchenko acknowledges, while that committee’s findings have so far been duly 
adopted by the COP to that treaty, this does mean the final arbiter is the contracting 
parties acting in plenary. Id. at 35. 
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that much of the normative content of the World Heritage regime is 
articulated in the [Guidelines] rather than in the Convention itself.”174 
The Guidelines, in turn, are formulated by the Committee on a two-thirds 
majority without any reference to all of the contracting parties. Absent 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the Committee, there is a real danger of a 
greater decline in support amongst the public for conservation activities. 
Many elements go into generating legitimacy; for example, public 
education initiatives can be used to help generate legitimacy in localities 
that tend to favor development and resist conservation. Nevertheless, two 
aspects of the regime may be having an undermining effect on 
legitimacy. The first relates to the continued indeterminacy of the 
normative content of Article 4, and the second to the constitution of the 
limited membership Committee itself.175 These are areas currently 
exhibiting weaknesses that can, and should, be tackled. By highlighting 
their link to compliance, it is hoped that extra weight can be lent to 
prioritizing their resolution. 
A. Indeterminacy 
There are two aspects of the Article 4 obligation where 
indeterminacy is an avoidable problem. First, there is indeterminacy as to 
which sites are regulated by this article. Second, it is unclear what the 
article (and the Convention generally) means by protection and 
conservation. While the uncertainty over the latter has left the field open 
for the Committee to interpret this so as to achieve the objectives of the 
Convention, it is imperative that it be explicit and consistent about the 
standards it is setting so as to maintain the legitimacy of its actions. 
1. Identifying the Relevant Properties 
Article 4 applies to sites forming part of the world heritage (as 
defined in Article 2), irrespective of listing. Significantly, the sites 
referred to in Article 2 are a far larger group than those inscribed on the 
World Heritage List by the Committee. Once the sites falling within 
 
174. Affolder, supra note 22, at 43, 53-54. 
175. Franck argues that four factors—all of which contribute to the legitimacy of an 
obligation—can generate a pull towards compliance with a rule unenforced by a coercive 
power. These factors relate to determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and 
adherence. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS, 30 
(Clarendon Press, 1995). This Article differs from Franck’s core thesis since the WHC 
has coercive power similar to the type he felt was often lacking. Nevertheless, two issues 
looked at in this Part do have parallels with the first and last of Franck’s legitimacy 
factors. 
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Article 2 are identified, they will not instantly or necessarily move onto 
the List. Nor is the contracting party obliged to nominate all potential 
sites for listing. However, as stated, Article 4 obligations attach to all 
properties so identified.176 
The central question then becomes, what evidence is sufficient to 
establish that a state has made such a decision and identified a natural 
property as falling within Article 2? The answer to this, which may vary 
from state to state, will be important for a range of stake-holders, such as 
non-governmental organizations, activists, the administrative bodies 
under the Convention, and other contracting parties keen to see that all 
states are meeting their obligations. Further, in federal systems, 
competence to deal with environmental matters may be divided between 
the central and regional governments according to whether a site falls 
under international law or only national law. There is then a need to 
identify Article 2 natural properties in order to determine the 
responsibilities of the two levels of government. Finally, other 
contracting state parties must be able to identify the properties that they 
are obliged to refrain from deliberately damaging in accordance with 
Article 6(3).177 
Beyond the World Heritage List itself,178 what are the likely sources 
of such evidence? The most obvious evidence would be tentative lists. 
These, after all, are the inventories of properties that, in the contracting 
parties’ opinions, form the natural heritage as defined in the WHC, and 
which they hope will be included in the World Heritage List. However, 
there are two problems with tentative lists as evidence. First, not all state 
parties have submitted these lists.179 While capacity to produce them 
 
176. See, e.g., Queensland v. The Commonwealth (1989) 167 C.L.R. 232 (High 
Court of Australia). In that case, Justice Dawson stated:  
The obligation of a State Party to protect, conserve, present and transmit to 
future generations the cultural and natural heritage situated on its territory does 
not flow from any listing upon the World Heritage List. It flows from the 
identification by the State Party of its cultural or natural heritage, an 
identification which the State Party is under a duty to make. 
177. WHC, supra note 1, Art. 6(3) dictates that “Each State Party to this 
Convention undertakes not to take any deliberate measures which might damage directly 
or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 situated on 
the territory of other States Parties to this Convention.” Recall that Article 6(3) was 
discussed above at the end of Part II.B. 
178. Inscription of a property in the World Heritage List by the Committee will, 
given the level of expertise guiding the Committee, be practically conclusive evidence 
that a natural property falls within Article 2. Support for this position has been given by 
Australia’s Justice Dawson (see note 176). This practical effect seems justifiable since 
Article 12 of the WHC indicates that the Committee’s decisions are not legally definitive. 
179. By April 2008, 162 of the 185 contracting parties had submitted tentative lists. 
Report of the 32nd Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, Doc. WHC-
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may be a large factor in this state of affairs, if tentative lists are also the 
evidentiary basis for attaching obligations to a property (and the benefits 
of World Heritage listing may not ultimately accrue), then this could 
discourage states from producing lists at all. 
The second problem lies in resolving the position of a property that 
is on an existing list, but whose nomination to the World Heritage List 
has been unsuccessful. The WHC states: 
The fact that a property belonging to the cultural or natural heritage 
has not been included in either [the World Heritage List or the 
Danger List] shall in no way be construed to mean that it does not 
have an outstanding universal value for purposes other than those 
resulting from inclusion in these lists.180 
Thus, a site could still be regarded by the unsuccessful nominating state 
as having outstanding universal value for one of those other purposes; 
most notably for the definition of natural heritage. In such circumstances 
the obligations under Articles 4, 5, and 6 would continue to apply. Yet 
despite this, there remains no clear procedure to determine if a state does 
indeed continue to regard the unlisted property as being part of the 
natural heritage. The lack of determinacy in relation to the fundamental 
issue of which sites are caught by Article 4 (and Article 6(3)) seems an 
unnecessary shortcoming. A form of official pronouncement from the 
state party involved seems a simple solution to this indeterminacy. 
Beyond tentative lists, it is conceivable that documents or records 
produced for internal circulation at the national level might also be clear 
evidence. For example, state parties are supposed to produce national 
inventories of properties regarded as reflecting their cultural and natural 
heritage. Additionally, announcements regarding the status of important 
sites may be made by governments. Again, given the potential for these 
lists and announcements to identify the properties to which the 
obligations policed by the Committee under the WHC attach, clear 
procedures need to be in place for these to be made available to all 
relevant and concerned parties. 
2. Protection and Conservation 
Further, the WHC does not define “protection,” “preservation,” or 
“conservation.” Nevertheless, these terms are used freely in WHC 
documents in practice. However, while these phrases may not have been 
used as terms of art by the regime, particularly during the first twenty 
 
08/32.COM/8A (Apr. 15, 2008) (providing the Tentative Lists submitted by States Parties 
as of April 15, 2008, in conformity with the Operational Guidelines). 
180. WHC, supra note 1, at Art. 12. 
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years of the WHC, it has been claimed that “in the development of nature 
protection law, each of these concepts come [sic] to have its own 
meaning and that meaning can be significant for the legal scope of the 
provisions of the international documents in which these concepts are to 
be found.”181 
Generally, these terms have the following associations. “Protection” 
suggests a duty to prevent a specific threat that may cause damage, 
although it does not cover the future use of the subject once the threat is 
removed.182 “Protection” has also been used to denote a concern for the 
welfare of animals, thus carrying more ethical connotations.183 
“Preservation” and “conservation,” conversely, are concerned with 
the future management of a subject. “Preservation” has been defined as 
setting a subject aside and guarding it so as to maintain its natural 
characteristics in a manner unaffected by human activity.184 This may 
therefore imply that commercial utilization is not permitted under an 
obligation to preserve a natural area or object.185 On the other hand, 
“conservation” has been linked to sustainable use of a resource so that it 
may be enjoyed by present generations while maintaining its potential to 
meet the needs of future generations.186 Therefore, commercial 
utilization is, in theory, permitted so long as it is sustainable. Of course 
in order to maintain a resource’s potential for future generations, short-
term protective measures, or longer term preservationist management 
levels may be needed. Thus, conservation can include protection and 
preservation.187 
The current imprecise use of these terms under the WHC without 
due consideration of the implications of such use is problematic. As 
noted by Christina Cameron with respect to the WHC, “If the 
international community is to monitor World Heritage Sites, it must have 
access to universally agreed-upon standards of conservation—or, more 
accurately, standards for the acceptable limits of change—against which 
to monitor.”188 
 
181. P. VAN HEIJNSBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF WILD FAUNA 
AND FLORA 43 (IOS Press, 1997). 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 44 (quoting the 1991 Draft Covenant on Environmental Conservation 
and Sustainable Use of Natural Resources). 
185. Id. 
186. M. J. Bowman, The Ramsar Convention Comes of Age, 42 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 
1, 15 (1995). 
187. Van Heijsbergen, supra note 181, at 51-2. 
188. Christina Cameron, The Strengths and Weaknesses of the World Heritage 
Convention, 28(3) NATURE & RESOURCES 18, 20 (1992). 
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Formulating and disseminating clearer guidelines on the acceptable 
limits of change would put the Committee in a more legitimate position 
to hold national governments accountable for their obligations. This 
would therefore enhance compliance pull by giving greater credibility to 
the reactive monitoring activities of the Committee. MEAs, such as 
Ramsar, have produced detailed guidance to assist enclave managers and 
state parties to meet their obligations. Unfortunately only recently has it 
even been suggested that such guidance should be produced under the 
WHC.189 Until such guidance arrives, the inconsistent use of what appear 
to be terms of art undermines the determinacy of the WHC, the 
legitimacy of the Committee’s responses, and the possibility for 
compliance pull.190 
B. The Legitimacy of the Committee 
In the past, concerns were raised about the constitution of the 
Committee and the consequences flowing from the range of states that 
have enjoyed terms of office. In 2000, figures prepared by Belgium 
indicated that ninety-five contracting parties had never been represented 
on the Committee, while ten parties had been elected more than three 
times.191 Further, those states that had not been on the Committee had 
few, if any, sites on the World Heritage List, while the opposite was true 
 
189. Report of the 25th Ordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee, 
¶ III.14, Doc. WHC-01/CONF.208/24 (Dec. 2001). 
190. It remains currently unclear whether the limit of permitted change set by 
Article 4 of the WHC is one of preservation, or only such change as is needed to facilitate 
presentation of a site to the public (on which, see generally Haigh, supra note 6), or a 
limit which still allows commercial sustainable utilization. Jim Thorsell support’s the 
latter noting that, “listing does not preclude extractive use.” Jim Thorsell, Nature’s Hall 
of Fame: IUCN and the World Heritage Convention 7(2) PARKS 3, 3 (1997). This seems 
to be a fair observation. Such extraction is permitted within the Great Barrier Reef World 
Heritage Site in zones permitting sport fishing, for example. However, it may be that the 
standard of management is a bespoke form of sustainable development for the WHC in 
that the sites must be managed in a way that also maintains their heritage values. In 2005, 
such a stance received general support when the Guidelines stated at Paragraph 119:  
World Heritage Properties may support a variety of ongoing and proposed uses 
that are ecologically and culturally sustainable. The State Party and partners 
must ensure that such sustainable use does not adversely impact the outstanding 
universal value, integrity and/or authenticity of the property.  
Guidelines, supra note 26, ¶ 119. 
191. Report of the 24th Ordinary Session of the Bureau of The World Heritage 
Committee, para VI.7(5), Doc. WHC-2000/CONF.202/17 (Aug. 2000), available at 
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2000/whc-00-conf202-17e.pdf > page 56, ¶ V.7(5). 
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for those who had enjoyed multiple terms of office.192 Belgium seemed 
to suggest there was a correlation.193 
Article 8(2) of the WHC states that the “election of members of the 
Committee shall ensure an equitable representation of the different 
regions and cultures of the world.”194 Nevertheless, as Belgium’s data 
seems to suggest, this has been difficult to translate into practice. 
Increasing the permitted number of states on the Committee was felt to 
be an impractical solution since the limit of twenty-one is set by Article 
8(1) and would consequently require formal amendment.195 Fortunately, 
a number of alternative approaches have been adopted. Voluntarily 
abstaining from seeking re-election at the end of a six-year term has been 
frequently promoted, as encapsulated in the resolution of the General 
Assembly in 1989.196 Since then, more significant changes have been 
introduced, whereby one seat is reserved on the Committee for a state 
with no property listed on the World Heritage List.197 The system 
remains under regular review, which should be welcomed as part of the 
process for ensuring and enhancing legitimacy. 
VII. CONCLUSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORLD 
HERITAGE REGIME AND THE BUILT-IN PROCESS OF 
COMPLIANCE PULL 
The creation of the Committee brought into existence a centralized 
body with considerable executive powers. These powers are often 
retained under a treaty by contracting parties acting in plenary as a COP. 
Yet in the case of the WHC, power has been almost entirely devolved to 
the Committee, which is, significantly, a limited membership body. 
Some of these powers give substance to the obligations and detail to the 
procedures by which the Convention is to be implemented. This is 




194. WHC, supra note 1, at Art. 8(2). 
195. Report of the Special Session of the Bureau of The World Heritage Committee, 
¶ 6, DOC. WHC 2000/Conf.202/4 Rev.1 (SPE) (Oct. 2000). 
196. Summary Record of the 7th General Assembly, ¶ 12, Doc. CC-89/CONF.013/6 
(Nov. 1989). Such moves however have proved unsuccessful with a number of states 
ignoring the resolution; for example, the United States in 1991, and China, Egypt, 
Mexico, and Spain in 1997. 
197. This was first put into practice at the 13th General Assembly in 2001. See 
Summary Record of the 13th General Assembly, ¶ 82, Doc. WHC-2001/CONF.206/8 
Rev (Oct. 2001). 
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practice of the Committee. Ultimately, these enable the Committee to 
steer the content of the obligations towards standards that are themselves 
substantial and effective. 
Powers over implementation must be added to these powers of 
defining content. At this key point, the Committee acts as a “gatekeeper” 
to the significant benefits (both economic and political) offered under the 
treaty. It is the Committee who controls the brand and ensures that only 
the best of the best sites are inscribed as the world’s heritage. It is also 
the Committee that awards financial assistance from the World Heritage 
Fund. 
Finally, the Committee plays the central role in reviewing 
implementation by contracting parties and, if necessary, investigating 
possible instances of non-compliance uncovered via reactive monitoring. 
While systems for implementation review and non-compliance 
procedures are increasingly common within international environmental 
law, only a few MEA regimes exist which delegate enforcement powers 
to centralized bodies. Currently the WHC is rarely mentioned in this 
context, but in the future it should be. The Committee not only serves the 
role of giving meaning to non-compliance with key obligations, but also 
has the authority, in practice, to recognize non-compliance. After 
recognizing non-compliance, the Committee has real sanctioning 
options, from making unilateral requests, which the contracting parties 
may well regard as punitive, to ultimately de-listing and eliminating 
benefits. Nevertheless, the Committee still rightly prefers to offer 
management options in the first instance. While the WHC shares 
important features with the Montreal Protocol, LRTAP, CITES, the 
Aarhus Convention, and the Kyoto Protocol, it goes beyond these treaties 
in a powerful way: the enforcement powers of the Committee are not 
limited by a need to obtain the support of all the parties acting as a 
plenary—instead, that power is exercised by the small group of states 
elected to the twenty-one seats. 
The elaboration, implementation, and enforcement roles of the 
Committee combine to draw states into compliance with the provisions 
of the treaty. The treaty creates a real or perceived association between 
cooperation with the Committee, performance of obligations, and 
furthering one’s own national interests. These treaty-generated forces 
undermine the notion of unfettered freedom in decision making and 
suggest a sense of coercion based upon self-interest. This positioning of 
the Committee has had a major impact upon the logic of consequences 
that states engage in, so as to favor conserving and protecting natural 
heritage in compliance with the treaty’s objectives. Given that the set-up 
employed is unusual among MEAs, it is a real surprise that the World 
Heritage system is so often omitted from compliance discourse. 
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Nevertheless, determinacy and questions over the composition of 
the Committee have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the 
body and reduce the treaty’s capacity to pull states towards compliance. 
If there was ever a need to find justifications for committing resources to 
addressing these elements of the system, this Article provides one of 
some significance—the potential impact on compliance pull. 
 
